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Abstract. Using novel firm-level data, we examine the trade effect of the changed secu-
rity arrangements for Pakistan’s exports to the US following 9/11. The pre-shipment
scanning facility introduced by the Integrated Cargo Container Control (IC3) program,
following the 100% scanning requirement, affected the beyond-the-border and behind-
the-border costs of exporting. We exploit the exogenous nature of this shock and its
specificity to one export market in the identification strategy. The estimates show
Pakistan’s exports dropped by between 8% and 11% because of IC3 but that the effect
was heterogeneous across firms depending upon their pre-IC3 port of departure and
whether they switched following IC3. We also show that the export fall would have
been even greater if 100% scanning had been introduced without a pre-shipment scan-
ning facility.
Résumé. Mise en place du Programme de contrôle intégré des conteneurs de fret au
Pakistan : aide ou inconvénient au commerce? Dans le sillage des événements du
11 septembre 2001, et grâce à de nouvelles données d’entreprises, nous examinons les
conséquences commerciales liées aux modifications sécuritaires s’appliquant aux expor-
tations pakistanaises à destination des États-Unis. Le dispositif de scannage préalable
avant expédition, introduit par le Programme de contrôle intégré des conteneurs de fret
(programme IC3) et respectant les exigences de scannage intégral, eut des conséquen-
ces sur les coûts d’exportation en amont et en aval des frontières. Afin d’établir une
stratégie d’identification, nous exploitons la nature exogène de ce choc ainsi que sa
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spécificité propre à un marché d’exportation particulier. Nos estimations montrent
qu’en raison de la mise en place de l’IC3, les exportations pakistanaises diminuèrent de
8 à 11 %. Néanmoins, l’effet s’est avéré hétérogène pour les entreprises en fonction de
leur port d’expédition avant l’IC3, et le cas échéant, de leur nouveau port d’expédition
après l’IC3. Nous montrons également que les exportations auraient chuté davantage si
le scannage intégral avait été introduit sans un système de scannage préalable avant
expédition.
JEL classification: F1, F13, F14
1. Introduction
IN A WORLD where the threats to national security are globalized, trans-portation networks have been recognized as a weak link that could be
exploited to ship the technologies of terrorism internationally (Meade and
Molander 2006, OECD 2005). The reliance of international trade on these
same networks highlights an importance in understanding and quantifying
the trade effects that arise from policy responses to counter this terrorist
threat. A typical assumption is that inevitably these additional security
requirements must be trade impeding. However, on occasion, such as the one
we study, they can also lead to an upgrade in the technology used by border
agencies, potentially boosting trade. Whether their use is sufficient to offset
any negative effects is, ultimately, an empirical question.
Evaluation of the design and implementation of counterterrorism policies
is made difficult by the fact that countries do not alter or adopt new security
policies randomly but rather do so in response to the actual or perceived
threat of terrorism, confounding variables that can additionally affect trade
flows directly or indirectly through numerous channels (Mirza and Verdier
2008). In this paper, we provide such analysis by exploiting the quasi-
experimental setting that followed from the imposition of a new counterterror-
ism policy on Pakistan by the US that arose from the events of September 11,
2001, (commonly known as 9/11) and the terrorist threat posed by its neigh-
bour Afghanistan.
In the period following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US administration
conducted several reviews of national security policy.1 The fear that con-
tainerized cargo could be used to smuggle radioactive or nuclear materials into
the US through vulnerable countries such as Pakistan featured heavily in this
analysis. The policy responses were numerous2 and extended beyond exports
destined for the US from Pakistan. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required
1 These include the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) as well as Meade and Molander
(2006).
2 These include the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (2001), the Homeland
Security Act (2002) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (2002).
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100% scanning of US-bound exports from all countries, with 2012 set as the
date for full implementation. There are, therefore, some potential wider les-
sons from the Pakistan experience for other countries, but the timing and nat-
ure of the measures applying in the case of Pakistan were specific to the
Integrated Cargo Container Control (IC3) program. Following the passing by
the US Congress of a law requiring mandatory screening and scanning and
starting in 2007, the program involved the live monitoring of the scanning of
containers for radioactive and contraband items in Pakistan by the National
Targeting Centre (NTC) in Washington, DC, via a video link (Government
Accountability Office 2008). Once Washington gave security clearance, the
container was allowed to enter the US without further checks. The scanning
technology made available by the US to the Pakistan authorities was suffi-
cient for its use at a single port, which was chosen to be Port Qasim (see maps
in the online appendix for location of this port). In the year prior to IC3, Port
Qasim accounted for around 35% of Pakistan–US freight.
For US-bound freight, the availability of pre-shipment scanning was
expected to reduce beyond-the-border trade costs compared with the pre-IC3
period and compared with non-US bound freight. Pre-IC3 Pakistan’s exports
to the US were subject to random interception and diversion to ports in Sri
Lanka, Hong Kong or Oman for scanning.3 Table 1 reports on the comparison
of shipping distances and times from Pakistan to the US (New York and Los
Angeles) with (possible pre-IC3) and without (certain post-IC3) diversion to
one of the above international ports for scanning. For shipments to New York,
for example, the shipping distance is nearly 20% shorter and saves six days in
sailing time with diversion to Sri Lanka avoided. Indeed, for this reason the
program was viewed and presented ex ante as trade-promoting by the
Pakistan government and others. “The implementation of the IC3 will reduce
the cost of country’s exports to the US. Presently, all cargoes destined for US
from Pakistan are trans-shipped to Hong Kong, Colombo and Salalah for scan-
ning, resulting in delay and extra financial cost to the exporters. The facility will
also help exporters save time and money” (The News International 2007).
Focusing on beyond-the-border costs does not, however, accurately cap-
ture all of the effects of the program on overall trade costs, which also include
at-the-border and behind-the-border costs. This point is often neglected in
estimates of the effects on counterterrorism policies on international trade. In
fact, at-the-border and behind-the-border trade costs rose as a consequence of
IC3, principally from the way IC3 was implemented. Most obviously, they
rose because of the time taken to complete the 100% scanning requirement (at
the border or on route) compared with the probabilistic stop and search (on
3 The exception to this was less-than-full-load containers that could continue to be
shipped through non-Port Qasim ports such as the Port of Karachi. For these
routes, beyond-the-border trade costs rose because of the mandatory scanning
requirement as a transhipment port.
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route) approach used previously. They also rose because of the congestion
caused by technology being available only at a single outbound port. For
freight previously routed through other ports in Pakistan, exporters had the
choice to transfer cargo through Port Qasim or continue to use other ports.
Figure 1 reports on the proportion of US-bound exports each year from alter-
native ports in Pakistan for the period from 2005 to 2014. Note the marked
rise in the proportion from Port Qasim after 2007, rising from less than 40% in
2007 to nearly 70% by 2011. The journey to Port Qasim via road was longer
to and around Karachi compared with the route to the Port of Karachi (see
TABLE 1





Sri Lanka Hong Kong Salalah (Oman)
KM KM Diff. (%) KM Diff. (%) KM Diff. (%)
A: Maritime distance (km)
New York 14,812 18,424 −19.60 28,591 NA 14,852 −0.27
Los Angles 19,564 19,756 −0.97 19,828 −1.33 21,754 −10.07
B: Vessel sailing time (days)
Destination Days Days Diff. Days Diff. Days Diff.
New York 24 30 −6 45 NA 25 −1
Los Angles 31 32 −1 32 −1 35 −4











2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Qasim Port Airports Dry ports Port of Karachi
FIGURE 1 Internal diversion of US-bound export cargo to Port Qasim because of
centralization of scanning operations, 2005–2014
NOTE: Values on the y-axis are the trade shares of various export-processing stations in the
total US-bound exports.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data of Pakistan Customs
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maps in online appendix figures A.1 and A.2). In figure 2, we report the rela-
tive share of exports to US/EU by customs station. Again, important for the
analysis, we find that the share of exports to the US using Port Qasim rises
relative to EU exports using the same port in the post-IC3 period. We find
that these shares were almost equal before 2007. We also find that the share of
US-bound exports using the Port of Karachi, which was greater than the share
of EU exports using that port pre-IC3, falls relatively in the post-IC3 period.
Table 2 summarizes the increase in internal road distances for exports
diverted from the Port of Karachi to Port Qasim for firms located in dif-
ferent cities in Pakistan. The average internal distance that exports were
transported rose by about 5% (in unweighted terms) and by 9.3% when
weighted by export values from the different locations. The distance-
raising effect was greater for export firms closer to Karachi (where the
majority of exporters were located), doubling the distance to the outbound
port for firms in Karachi but increasing it by only 3.4% for firms in Peshawar
(firms here, on average, being over 1,600 km from both ports). Therefore,
for those firms that switched to exporting through Port Qasim, behind-
the-border trade costs rose because of the longer domestic journey times.
These higher costs were ameliorated to some extent by adjustments to the
implementation of the program in 2011 through expansion of port infras-
tructure and scanning, which we control for in our empirical analysis. For
firms that continued to use ports other than Port Qasim, shipping times
rose because of the longer distances involved on average with transship-
ment via a foreign port and the required scanning at the port. Behind-the-
border and at-the-border costs were, however, unchanged in this case. To
disentangle questions about the trade effects of the pre-clearance scanning

















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Qasim Port Airports Dry ports Port of Karachi
FIGURE 2 Relative share of US/EU exports by customs station, 2005–2014
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data of Pakistan Customs
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imposed on some exporters, we rely heavily on the transaction-level trade
data available to us and on information about firms’ port for shipment
and their within-country location.
In the next section of the paper, we lay out in more detail the motiva-
tion, design, introduction and the equipment used for this change in coun-
terterrorism policy and how it affected trade costs with the US but not
those to other international markets. We use the insights as a motivation
to study the trade effects of the IC3 program using a difference-
in-differences (DID) framework, with Pakistan’s trade with EU countries
as a counterfactual.4 For the question we study, there are a number of
advantages to the use of the DID approach alongside customs data on
exports that vary by firm, product and time. First, by design, the applica-
tion of a DID framework helps to remove changes to trade flows to all
Western countries that are explained by any changes in the perception
that Pakistan was a source of terrorism from neighbouring Afghanistan.
Secondly, it does not require that the adoption of IC3 and location only at
Port Qasim be exogenous, only that it was so from the perspective of
Pakistan’s exporters—a reasonable assumption given the small average size
and low international market power of these firms.
TABLE 2
“Behind-the-border”: Increases in internal distance to port for diverted exports
Export origin:
Distance to ports (in km) % increase Export weight
Karachi Port Qasim 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Faisalabad 1,188 1,243 4.6 0.123
Gujranwala 1,345 1,400 4.9 0.010
Hyderabad 147 202 37.4 0.001
Islamabad 1,506 1,561 3.7 0.001
Karachi 55 110 100.0 0.532
Lahore 1,265 1,320 4.3 0.149
Multan 943 998 5.8 0.004
Peshawar 1,601 1,656 3.4 0.000
Quetta 670 725 8.2 0.019
Rawalpindi 1,501 1,556 3.7 0.001
Sargodha 1,396 1,451 3.9 0.000
Sialkot 1,219 1274 4.5 0.161
% increase
Simple average 1,070 1,125 5.1 15.3
Weighted average 593 648 9.3 55.4
NOTES: Columns (2) and (3) contain shortest road distances from centre of towns to sea-
ports measured with the Google Maps. Column (5) contains export weights for 2009.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations
4 Its timing was also difficult to anticipate owing to delays in funding (The News
International 2007).
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A third advantage draws on the ability to observe exports of different
products to different destinations by the same firms at different points in time.
This allows us to add many different combinations of firm, product, market
and time fixed effects in order to control for the effects of other possible
macro- and micro-level confounding influences that might otherwise explain
our results, sharpening the identification of the effects of IC3. Macro-level
influences could include improvements in domestic export policy, technology,
infrastructure and other institutional changes that could have affected trade
flows to both destinations in this period. To also remove the effects of unob-
servable time-varying firm-specific factors, we present results where the effects
of IC3 are identified from the change in export values between the US and EU
markets within the same firm and within the same year.
A final advantage from the data comes from our ability to observe the loca-
tion of the exporter within Pakistan. Our base modelling specifies the counter-
factual so as to evaluate the implementation of the changed security and
clearance options as a whole, i.e., to evaluate the effect of the 100% scanning
requirement and the provision of a pre-shipment scanning facility at Port
Qasim relative to Pakistan’s trade with the EU (which was not subject to
either the scanning requirement or the pre-clearance facility). Given that our
data allow us to distinguish between firms that decided to use the pre-
shipment scanning facility and those that satisfied the 100% scanning require-
ment at a non-Pakistani port, in the paper, we consider indirectly the alterna-
tive counterfactual, namely the trade effect of the introduction of the 100%
scanning requirement without the use of the pre-shipment clearance facility.
For brevity, we use the label IC3 to refer to the combined 100% scanning
requirement and the possible use of pre-shipment scanning, but in this later
heterogeneity analysis, we seek to explore the effects of the scanning require-
ment and pre-shipment clearance facility separately.
The base modelling identifies a fall in exports relative to the counterfac-
tual, one that is statistically significant. This is consistent with an interpreta-
tion that the implementation of IC3 raised overall trade costs to the US for
Pakistan exporters. Of the various types of firm–product–destination–time
effects that we add to the regression, the estimated effect of IC3 displays the
greatest sensitivity to the inclusion of controls for time-invariant firm–
destination effects in the estimation, halving it compared with a regression
without these controls. This helps demonstrate the value of using highly disag-
gregated trade data compared with using standard data on bilateral trade
flows to answer a question about the effects of IC3.5 Beyond the controls for
5 We show evidence in the paper on an effect on Pakistani exports when using
COMTRADE data that is of a similar magnitude to that found when using
Pakistani customs data and a regression with no firm–destination fixed effects
(table 4).
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firms and destinations, there is much less sensitivity compared with the initial
estimates, indicating that other types of confounding factors are not an issue.
We also provide evidence of the robustness of the main findings to the use
of China as an alternative counterfactual or control, and search for evidence
that there may be confounding trade diversion from the US to the EU markets
by distinguishing between the IC3 effect for firms that had previously served
both markets and those firms that had exported to the US only pre-IC3.6 We
find some evidence consistent with such an outcome, although the effects are
very modest and cannot explain our main findings. We also systematically
investigate whether our findings are driven by other confounding factors such
as military involvement by the US and some EU countries in Afghanistan over
this period. These additional tests indicate that our findings about the IC3
effect are robust.
We further use the richness of the international trade data available to
us by separating the effects of IC3 into the adjustments that occur for firms
that used Port Qasim prior to the introduction of IC3 versus those that
had previously used other ports. Consistent with figure 2, we show that the
mandatory scanning requirement and concentration of the scanning opera-
tions at Port Qasim led many firms to switch away from their previous port
of shipment. Using information on their pre-IC3 use of Port Qasim versus
alternative ports, including dry ports, we are able to show that the negative
effects of IC3 were confined to the non-Port Qasim users. For firms that
had used Port Qasim pre-IC3, we find no evidence of a significant drop in
exports relative to the counterfactual. This evidence indicates that it was
not the introduction of a domestic scanning capacity per se that had a
negative effect on trade but rather its availability at only a single outbound
domestic port that was export-reducing. The drop in trade for firms that
switched to Port Qasim after IC3 is greatest for the first four years of the
program, from 2007 to 2011. The port expansion in 2011 offset these
negative effects to some extent, although their net effects over the whole
post-IC3 period remain negative.
The disaggregate results also allow us to comment upon the question
“What if 100% scanning had been applied by the US to Pakistan exports
6 There is a high degree of product overlap in the composition of Pakistan’s
exports to the US and EU (see figure 2), with relatively high-value finished
exports to these two high-income markets with similar growth rates. By
contrast, Pakistan’s exports to China tend to be raw material and semi-processed
goods. This similarity of export composition makes the EU a better control. It may
also mean, however, that there is more scope for trade diversion between the US
and EU than between US and China with change in Pakistan’s relative bilateral
trade costs. Interestingly, we find a greater IC3 effect when China is used as the
control. Given this and the limited evidence of contamination of trade with the
control by the treatment (IC3), we present the findings with the EU as the control
as our base, preferred findings.
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without the creation of a pre-shipment scanning facility?” We find that those
firms that continued to export from other than Port Qasim and were required
to increase international transport distances and times in order to be scanned
at an international port experienced the largest trade destruction effect.
Indeed, the trade destruction effect for these firms was more than twice as
large as that experienced by those firms that switched to exporting from Port
Qasim in order to meet the scanning requirement.
This research extends the narrow stream of literature on trade and
security issues (European Commission [EC] 2009, Government Account-
ability Office 2008, Mirza and Verdier 2008, World Customs Organization
[WCO] 2009). Mirza and Verdier (2008), in a general analytical framework,
describe the existing relationships between terrorism, counterterrorism
actions and trade and argue that terrorism affects trade flows primarily
through two channels: reducing the willingness to do business with insecure
countries and the trade-restrictive effect of counterterrorism policies. Our paper
provides empirical evidence of these channels related to firm-level exports.
Similarly, the EC (2009), WCO (2009) and Government Accountability Office
(2008) argue against the feasibility of 100% scanning of US-bound exports
owing to the high costs associated with the internal movement of cargo,
congestion at ports and associated infrastructural constraints. Although
these studies found the scanning operations to be highly cost-intensive and
trade-restrictive, they did not perform quantitative assessments of the
magnitude of the trade-restricting impact because of data limitations. We
bridge this gap by using an administrative data set to estimate the trade
effect of IC3 and examine its heterogeneity along multiple dimensions at a
micro level.
Our findings add to the various strands of literature on technology and
trade, trade costs and trade diversion. The recent literature on technology
and trade examines the effect of containerization (Bernhofen et al. 2016) and
maritime transport (Hummels 2007, Pascali 2017), whereas this paper
explores the effect of intrusive scanning technology, which is increasingly
being adopted for security and trade facilitation purposes. The trade diversion
literature examines primarily the changes in importing countries’ trade pat-
terns in the context of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and free trade
agreements (FTAs) (e.g., Carrère 2006), whereas we explore the effect on the
exporting country’s trade flows due to the cost-raising effect of the security
policy. This trade diversion effect of behind-the-border costs also speaks to the
vast literature on trade costs (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003, 2004;
Arkolakis 2010; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Donaldson 2018; Feyrer 2009). In
contrast to these studies, we isolate the effect of this shock from other poten-
tially omitted variables influencing exports during this period by finding a
suitable counterfactual group. Finally, our results highlight a connection
between pre- and post-shipment time costs and exports. In this regard, this
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paper can be seen to support the findings of Djankov et al. (2010) about the
importance of time delays as a determinant of international trade.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section intro-
duces the data, describes the empirical setting and the estimation methodol-
ogy. Section 3 presents the main estimation results and section 4 the
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes by highlighting the policy implications
of the study.
2. Data and estimation framework
2.1. Data
The study uses data on international trade from Pakistan Customs.8 This
data set contains transaction-level information, including firm identifiers,
product codes, prices and quantities at an eight-digit Harmonized System
(HS) code level, in addition to the identities of export processing stations
and modes of shipment. It includes all product categories in manufacturing
and the agricultural sector, and covers the universe of firms shipping from
through dry ports, airports or seaports to 215 trading partners of Pakistan.
From this larger data set, we focus on Pakistan’s exports to the US and
EU markets.9
The cleaned data set of Pakistan’s exports to the EU and US contains
6.1 million transactions (3.8 million for the EU and 2.3 million for the US)
for 24,174 firms, of which 20,297 exported to the EU and 11,737 to the
US during the 2002–2014 period. This long time span covers seven years
7 Methodologically, we choose a different approach from the one used by this
paper. While these authors also use a difference-in-difference strategy, they focus
on differences in time costs according to the time sensitivity of the product. In
this paper, we instead exploit the fact that IC3 applied to trade for one country
to one destination but not others. We are also able to use differences in the
location of exporters and their distance to Port Qasim. This has some similarities
with the instrumental variable approach adopted by Djankov et al. (2010).
8 Use of this data set is subject to a confidentiality agreement. Most of the
information, however, is available from the Exporter Dynamic Database of the
World Bank.
9 We take the EU (28) for this purpose, i.e., consider that the countries acceding
during the period were already members from 2002. This allows us to hold the
control grouping of countries constant. In fact, there was pre-membership
convergence to EU trade policy by new members as part of their accession
process. As part of the robustness analysis, we form a control grouping that
includes only pre-2002 EU members (see table 5 and accompanying discussion).
It should also be noted that Pakistan’s exports to the EU (28) were dominated
throughout by exports to pre-2002 members, with the post-2002 new members
accounting for a small and fairly constant share (around 7% to 10%) of
Pakistan’s exports to the EU (28).
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prior to and seven years after the launch of IC3. For ease of estimations,
we collapse the data to the firm–product–market–year level. The final data
set, therefore, covers 606,351 observations, of which 458,838 pertain to the
EU and 147,413 to the US. We test the integrity and accuracy of the data
by performing aggregation tests and comparing the results with the same
information retrieved from the UN Comtrade data set. The remaining
information on other economic variables has been retrieved from the open
data sources of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Bank.
2.2. Estimation framework
To quantify the magnitude of the trade effect of the first intervention at the
firm level, we use the standard difference-in-difference regression framework,
which in its most basic form can be expressed as follows:
ln Xijkt
  ¼ β0 þ β1US j þ β2TIMEt þ β3IC3 jt þ ɛijkt; (1)
where i denotes the exporting firm, j the trading partner, k the product and
t the time (year). ln(Xijkt), the dependent variable, is the value of exports
(in logs) of firm i to market j for product k at a time t. Export values are
measured in PKR millions. US is a dummy variable equal to one if an obser-
vation relates to exports to the US and recorded as zero for exports to an
EU country, therefore identifying treated trade flows. Exports to the EU
countries are the counterfactual in the regression, for which we provide fur-
ther justification below. TIME captures the time period in which the treat-
ment occurs: it is a dummy variable equal to one for the 2007–2014 period,
and zero otherwise. Our regressor of interest is the term IC3, which is the
interaction term (US*TIME). A significant coefficient for this regressor, β3,
would suggest that exports to the treatment group (US) relative to the con-
trol group (EU) have altered following the introduction of the IC3 program
in 2007. ϵijkt is an idiosyncratic error term. Throughout standard errors are
clustered at the market–year level, the level of variation of regressor of inter-
est. To this specification, we add a series of control variables that account
for time-invariant firm–destination country characteristics, product- and
common year-specific effects. This forms the baseline model that we use in
much of the analysis.
We view the above difference-in-difference model as a naı̈ve interpretation
of the overall implementation of the IC3 program. In the rest of the analysis,
we extend this baseline model to capture differences in its impacts across
firms, capturing features of the implementation of IC3, and across time, as
adjustments were made to the initial program.
2.3. Description of IC3
The validity of the difference-in-difference design relies on the allocation of the
treatment, the use of the IC3 program for US trade, to be randomly assigned
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from the perspective of Pakistan’s exporters. To understand whether this
assumption holds in the current context requires further background informa-
tion on the IC3 program.
The integrated cargo containers control (IC3) program is part of the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) run by the US Department of Homeland
Security.10 IC3 built on the Container Security Initiative and the Mega Ports
Initiative, both started in 2001. The Container Security Initiative required the
stationing of US Customs and Border Protection officials at foreign ports to
scan containers based on risk assessment, whereas the Mega Ports Initiative
aimed at scanning as many containers as possible at high-volume ports. As
part of the earlier Container Security Initiative, US-bound commercial cargo
containers could be randomly intercepted and diverted to Sri Lanka, Hong
Kong or Oman for security scanning (European Commission 2009).11
IC3 began in April 2007. Its key feature is the mandatory requirement for
all Pakistan–US exports to undergo security scanning before their arrival in
the US.12 The scheme was a partnership between Pakistan Customs and the
US Customs and Border Protection. In Pakistan, the scanning technology to
complete the 100% scanning requirement was made available at Port Qasim
but also at ports in Sri Lanka, Hong Kong and Oman.13 Scanning could be
completed at Port Qasim or one of these other foreign ports. The Government
of Pakistan provided the funds for land acquisition14 at Port Qasim, whereas
the US authorities provided the X-ray scanners, radio portal monitors,
10 This was formally distinct from the 100% scanning requirement imposed on all
inbound US trade signed by President Bush on August 3, 2007, under the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, which imposed a 100% scanning requirement for all
countries by 2012. It was also separate to the SAFE Ports Act of 2006. Three
pilot ports were selected for the scheme: Southampton (United Kingdom), Port
Qasim (Pakistan) and Puerto Cortés (Honduras). A limited implementation
was agreed for four additional ports (Singapore, Busan in South Korea, Salalah
in Oman and Hong Kong in S.A.R. China). The insights from pilot schemes
operated under the SAFE Ports Act were supposed to inform the provisions for
freight scanning under the 9/11 Act, but that act was signed before the pilot
schemes had begun (European Commission 2009).
11 These were in addition to standard domestic border clearance procedures, such
as random physical inspections by Pakistan Customs and drug checks by the
anti-narcotics force.
12 The agreement for IC3 was signed following a visit to Pakistan by President
Bush in March 2006 and was due to open by December of the same year.
However, this was delayed by around three months because of the late release
of funds by the federal government (The News International 2007).
13 Megaports owned scanning equipment as part of their standard security
arrangements.
14 10 acres of land were used for IC3.
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communication systems and supporting technical assistance to Pakistan
Customs.15 Once cleared through Port Qasim, the cargo was placed on a
secured site before being shipped. It was not subject to re-examination upon
arrival at a US port, provided that the security seals on the container
remained intact. Shipments sent via foreign ports for scanning took between
two to six days longer to reach the US, depending on the destination port,
compared with shipments sent directly through Port Qasim (see table 1).
These arrangements and port capacity were left unaltered until 2011, when
the scanning yard at Port Qasim was expanded to double its capacity and an
off-dock terminal was developed near the Port of Karachi to collect US-bound
export cargo containers and arrange their further transportation to, and
processing at, Port Qasim.
From the perspective of Pakistan’s exporters, the introduction of the IC3
program might reasonably be regarded as exogenous. The project was estab-
lished as a result of the 9/11 attacks in the US and was imposed by the US in
the wake of the prevailing broader international security situation, in particu-
lar with respect to Pakistan’s neighbour Afghanistan. The Pakistan authori-
ties had no influence over the design of the policy, no exemptions were offered
for particular sectors and industries and Pakistan was not required to make
investment in equipment or infrastructure beyond supplying the necessary
land. Pakistan’s exporters are also small on average, and because they produce
often basic, standardized textile products, they have little or no market power
in international markets. Therefore, they had no influence on the design or
implementation of IC3.
2.4. Selection of a control group and tests for parallel trends
The scope and implementation of IC3 differs from many trade-related port or
infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a new port or improve-
ments in existing trade processing infrastructure, in that it effects are specific
to destination market. IC3 influenced the processing of Pakistan’s exports to
the US (treatment group) only, whereas those to all other markets remained
unaffected. Exports to non-US markets continued to be handled by ports
across Pakistan, including inland (also known as dry ports), and the security
arrangements were unaltered. Trade between Pakistan and other countries
was potentially affected by concerns about the threat of global terrorism in this
period, however, in particular that emanating from its neighbour Afghanistan.
The most obvious example of this followed the attacks in London in July
2007. The counterfactual, therefore, controls for these common shocks to the
demand for Pakistani produced goods. This empirical setting has another
attractive feature: unlike in cross-country studies, there is no obvious varia-
tion in institutional quality, production patterns and endowment that might
15 Its building cost reached US$8 million (European Commission 2009).
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explain the differential response of firms because both treatment and control
groups are from the same country.
Besides the US, the major destinations of Pakistan exports include China,
the EU and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although exports to these mar-
kets is comparable to that destined for the US, the structure of exports varies.
In terms of the nature of products, the EU is closer to the US because these
economies are key destinations for Pakistan’s textiles and other finished
goods.16 Textiles constitute around 75% of the Pakistan export basket to
these markets (see figure 3). The production process of these goods uses the
same raw materials, machinery and equipment.17 Given this, we use exports
to the EU countries as the counterfactual.
Before proceeding to develop a formal estimation strategy, we test the key
identifying assumption of parallel trends in the evolution of the control and
treatment groups in the pre-treatment period. The following graphical and
statistical analysis indicates that this assumption holds. Figure 4 plots
Pakistan’s total exports to the EU and US, the control and treatment groups
respectively. The chart suggests that the evolution of exports to both markets
was similar before the launch of IC3 but differed afterwards. Table A.1 in the
online appendix presents the results of two sample t-tests on an annual basis,
and shows that the difference in exports in this year, or indeed any other year,
does not differ significantly between US and EU countries prior to IC3. We
infer from this evidence that the assumption of parallel trends is satisfied and
the EU represents a valid counterfactual group.
3. Estimation results
In this section of the paper, we present evidence on the effects of the IC3 pro-
gram using the difference-in-differences model set out in section 2. We use
these to get a sense of the aggregate effects of the IC3 policy and its implemen-
tation and then test the robustness of these results. We push further on the
firms most affected by aspect of IC3 in the next section of the paper.
16 For comparison: exports to China mainly comprise raw materials and
semi-processed goods, whereas those to the US are higher-value finished
products. The UAE market attracts all kinds of products but exports to the
UAE are not necessarily absorbed in that market, but may transit through its
ports to other destinations.
17 The trade flow to the EU has not directly been affected by the introduction of
IC3, although it may be indirectly affected if there is destination substitution.
We address this potential concern in detail in the robustness analysis by
decomposing the trade effect across single- and multiple-market firms as well as
by using China as an alternative control on the assumption that export
diversion to China, as a lower-income country, is more difficult. We control for
the differences in product quality across markets in the estimations.
14 S. Ali, R. Kneller and C. Milner
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FIGURE 4 Pre- and post-treatment trends for the control (US) and treatment (EU)
groups, 2000–2013
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3.1. Baseline estimations for IC3 implementation
The introduction of IC3 meant a change in the pattern of trade costs for
Pakistan’s exporters. The evidence presented in figure 3 suggests that the effect
was to reduce exports to the US market. The growth of Pakistan’s exports prior
to the launch of IC3 to the US and EU is similar, but there is a marked
deviation post-IC3 implementation. After 2007, the value of exports to the US
remains largely unchanged until the end of the period, whereas exports to the
EU continue to rise.18 This evidence is consistent with an interpretation of
rising overall trade costs for US trade arising from the implementation of IC3.
Regression 1 in table 3 is where we present the estimation results for the
simplest form of the difference-in-difference model. In this regression, we
report the standard treatment (labelled US), time and treatment*time
(labelled IC3) variables from the DID model. The estimated coefficient on the
treatment*time effect is negative and significant. According to the results
from this regression, the introduction of the IC3 program policy in 2007 led to
a fall in US exports relative to the counterfactual of 21% (1-exp−0.241).
In the remaining columns of the table, we compare the magnitude of this
effect when we add various combinations of firm, destination, product and
time effects that explain micro-level trade flows and might also be correlated
with the response to the IC3 program. Of particular concern is the presence of
unobservable firm, product and time effects that determine who and the type
of products that are exported to the US market compared with the EU. To
control for such selection bias, in turn we add a full set of dummy variables for
firm–destination effects (regression 2); firm–destination and product (regres-
sion 3) effects; firm–destination, products and time effects (regression 4);
firm–time effects, firm–destination and product effects (regression 5);
product–time and firm–destination effects (regression 6) and firm–
destination–product and year effects, where the products are measured at the
eight-digit HS code level.19
The results in regression 2 indicate that the types of firms that export to
the US market may differ in their time-invariant characteristics from those
that export to the various EU markets. From the results, one might suggest
that firms that export to the US are “better” than those who export to EU
markets and this serves to bias upwards the estimated effect of the IC3 pro-
gram. Relying on the within-firm–destination variation within the data, the
results show that exports fell by an estimated 11% as a consequence of the IC3
program rather than the 21% from regression 1.
18 Formal testing also shows no break in trend for exports to the EU between the
pre- and post-IC3 periods. This is consistent with any negative IC3 effect on
exports to the US not being explained mainly by a source substitution or
diversion effect that increased exports to the EU.
19 To estimate the model with high-dimensional fixed effects, we use the Stata
command “reghdfe,” as suggested in Guimaraes and Portugal (2010).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Implementation in Pakistan of US IC3 program 17
As already noted, the type of products that Pakistan exports to the US
and EU is similar. It is then perhaps of little surprise that controlling for pro-
duct characteristics, even at the eight-digit HS code level in regression 3 has
relatively little effect on the estimated effect of the IC3 program. Again the
estimated effect of IC3 is close to 10%. In regression 4, we account for the
presence of shocks to world trade that are year-specific but are common across
the US and EU as export markets for Pakistan. In the post-IC3 time period,
most obviously, this captures the effects of shocks to world trade associated
not only with the global financial crisis and falling world demand but also with
any effects from the war with neighbouring Afghanistan. It may also capture
common movements in the demand for exports from Pakistan owing to
changes in its perceived terrorist threat. These are included along with firm–
destination and product fixed effects. Again, we find that this has some mod-
est effect on the size of the estimated effect from the IC3 program, although
the effect remains negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.
In regression 5, we consider the possibility of omitted variable bias at the
level of the firm further by controlling for time-varying changes to firms that
may affect trade (alongside product effects). These firm–time effects could
include unobservable changes to the management and organization of the firm
that affect all exports by that firm, shocks to their productivity or heterogeneity
in the effects of the global financial crisis across firms. In this regression
(regression 5), the effects of IC3 are identified from the within firm–year and
firm–destination variation in the data. Despite the rather demanding nature
of this regression specification, we continue to find evidence that trade from
Pakistan to the US was negatively affected by the introduction of the IC3
program, where the estimated effect is if anything slightly larger than in
regression 4.
In regression 6, we control for differences in the response of different prod-
ucts to common shocks by adding product–year dummies.20 Again, despite
the large number of dummy variables that are added to the regression in this
model, the effect of IC3 is found to be negative and the magnitude of the effect
is similar to that already reported. Finally, in regression 7, we control for any
observable or unobservable time-invariant differences in the types of products
that are exported by a given firm to the various US and EU markets by add-
ing firm–destination–product fixed effects. In this regression, we lose many
20 For instance, Pakistan’s textile exports to both the US and EU before 2005
(and at least two years before the implementation of IC3) had been subject to
quota controls under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), though subject also
to liberalization over a period after 1995. Fugazza and Conway (2010) identify
these quotas as being binding in both the US and EU in the case of Pakistan,
in which case, the elimination of quotas may have induced differential
expansion paths from 2005. This is not evident in Pakistan’s total exports to the
US and EU (see figure 3), but regression 6 in table 3 offers further reassurance the
measured IC3 effect is not capturing delayed MFA liberalization effect.
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observations because we cannot estimate the firm–destination–product effects
for the firm–product combinations that appear only once in the data. The evi-
dence from this regression suggests that the introduction of IC3 reduced
exports from Pakistan to the US by a little less than 8%.
It should be noted that any serial correlation in exports to specific markets
might tend to downwardly bias the standard errors on the IC3 variable in
table 3, which are clustered at the market–year level. We can confirm, how-
ever, that the significance level on IC3 is sustained if the standard errors are
clustered at the market level only. Note also that, as part of the later robust-
ness analysis, we explicitly allow for the possibility of serial correlation by col-
lapsing the time series data to simple pre- and post-treatment observations.
3.2. Robustness
We consider now some further issues around the robustness of the baseline
results in table 3. Of the various regressions in table 3, we use regression 4 as
the baseline, controlling for firm–destination, product and year effects. This
noticeably reduces the magnitude of the coefficient compared with regres-
sion 1, but the coefficient on IC3 from this specification remains robust to the
inclusion of other combinations of control variables.
The first-difference estimator is often proposed as part of the robustness
testing for the difference-in-difference estimator because it relies on weaker
exogeneity assumptions and is more efficient when the error term is serially
correlated (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). Demir and Javorcik (2014) adopt a
similar approach in firm-level estimations in order to account for any differ-
ence in pre-shock trends. Moreover, first-differencing of data takes account of
the specific firm–product time-invariant factors, such as firms’ experience of
exporting a product to a given destination, and addresses any concerns about
the non-stationarity of the series. We report the results from the first differ-
ence model as regression 1 in table 4. The results in table 4 provide support
for our baseline findings because the coefficient of interest bears the expected
signs and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the drop
in trade explained by IC3 is larger than the baseline estimation at 11%, but is
in the range of the estimates found in table 3.
As part of the robustness of difference-in-difference estimates Betrand
et al. (2004) also recommend collapsing the time series data to a single pre-
and post-treatment period to account for the problem of serial correlation
when there are repeated observations. We report the results from this as
regression 2 in table 4. Our findings again appear robust to this issue and if
anything the magnitude of the effect of the IC3 program increases compared
with the estimates in table 3.
In table 3, we controlled for the possibility that firms were affected by
shocks differently using firm–time effects in regression 5, and that products
had different product cycles by introducing product–time effects in regres-
sion 6. We did not, however, allow for the possibility that the timing of
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shocks, such as the financial crisis, led to different policy responses and the dif-
ferential pace of recovery across the EU and US. That is shocks had a market-
specific dimension. To address this concern, we control for import demand in
the regression.21 The coefficient of interest in this regression (reported as
regression 3 in table 4) remains negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level, while the import demand variable has a significant and positive effect as
expected.
Next we consider the role of the counterfactual in the regression. From the
description of the IC3 program, a first concern is that the counterfactual may
itself be contaminated by the introduction of IC3 because some exporters
diverted efforts to serving the EU market. If this occurs, then it would tend to
exacerbate the difference in trade to US and EU markets and increase the
magnitude of the trade effects of IC3 in our regressions. To consider the plau-
sibility of this argument, we separate firms that exported just to an EU coun-
try or the US (single destination exporters) from those that served both the
US and EU. On the assumption that there are fixed or sunk costs of exporting,
we would expect that the single-destination exporters should be less able to
divert trade across destinations. That is, we would expect the effects of the
IC3 program to be smaller when we consider single destination exporters and
larger for firms that serve both markets.
We report the results comparing outcomes for single-destination exports in
regression 4 and exporters who already served both the US and EU markets in
regression 5. We find the expected pattern in the results, the effect of IC3 is
larger for firms that had the greatest possibility of diverting trade from the
affected US market to the EU market. However, in both cases, the effect of
IC3 remains negative and statistically significant and, reassuringly, the magni-
tude of the decline in trade for the single destination exporters is not dissimilar
to in the baseline regressions. Trade by firms serving just the US market or an
EU country fell relative to firms serving just the EU market by 7%, close to
previous estimates, whereas for firms serving both US and EU markets trade
fell by 12% in the post-IC3 period.
In regression 6, we explore the use of an alternative counterfactual for US
trade. IC3 targeted exclusively Pakistan’s US-bound exports, whereas those
to other markets, including China, were not subjected to screening. Although
there is less similarity in market conditions and product mix between the US
and China than is the case for the US and EU, using China as an alternative
counterfactual offers two specific advantages. First, exports to China were not
affected by the conclusion of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)
in 2005, which might have influenced textiles exports to the EU market due to
the removal of the quota under ATC. Second, the demand for Pakistani
exports into the US and China are likely to be different such that the scope for
21 This variable is measured by net imports in market j (US) less imports by j
from Pakistan in product k at time t.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Implementation in Pakistan of US IC3 program 21
exporting firms to switch markets following IC3 is more limited than in the
EU case. Concerns about trade diversion contaminating the counterfactual
are, therefore, less likely to apply.22 Regression 6 in table 4 indicates that the
drop in trade between Pakistan and the US is even larger when using trade
with China as the counterfactual than using Pakistan’s trade with the EU as
a control group. In the post-treatment period, Pakistan’s US-bound exports
relative to China drop by 19%, on average.
As a further exercise in this section, we conduct a placebo test where we
consider trade between India, the US and the EU. By so doing, we seek to
test whether the difference in the pattern of trade we observe between
Pakistan–US and Pakistan–UE in the post-IC3 period might be explained by
a more general difference in trade into the US and EU markets. To conduct
this test, we use a different data set, the UN Comtrade database, where
products are now measured at the six-digit HS code level. While this exercise
also allows us to test the robustness of our findings to the use of an alterna-
tive data source, the disadvantage of using such data is that they do not
allow us to control for time-invariant differences in the type of firms export-
ing to the US and EU markets. The results from regression 2 of table 3 sug-
gest that this was an important difference for the magnitude of estimates of
the effects of IC3.23
In regression 7, we first show the robustness of our results for Pakistan
to the use of the UN Comtrade data. The difference in the different esti-
mates shows that relative to the counterfactual of EU exports, Pakistan’s
exports to the US dropped by 24% on average. This difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. The effect is expected to be larger than
those reported regression 4 in table 3 given the absence of firm-specific
information in the UN Comtrade data and that it is close to the estimates
in regression 1, where we also did not control for time-invariant unobserv-
able firm–destination characteristics. This differs from the pattern found
for Indian exports to the same markets over this time period reported in
regression 8. Indian exports to the US were unaffected by the introduction
of IC3 in India, compared with the counterfactual. Also important, the
magnitude of the treatment effect in regression 8 is very close to zero in
its overall magnitude, indicating that the treatment effect of IC3 is not
poorly identified in the data.
In regression 1 in table 5, we extend the modelling of the implementation
of IC3 to capture the 2011 port expansion at Port Qasim. We capture this by
22 We also formally conducted a parallel trends test for Pakistan’s exports to
China and the US in the pre-IC3 period in the same way as for the base results.
The assumption of a parallel trend is satisfied.
23 We also find the coefficient on IC3 effect to be of very similar magnitude
(−0.258) if we aggregate our own data on the same basis as we do the
Comtrade data.
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separating the effects of IC3 into pre- and post-2011 time periods. In the
regression, the variable IC3 2007–2014 is a dummy variable equal to one for
the period 2007–2014, and zero otherwise, and IC3 2011–2014 is also a
dummy variable equal to one for the period 2011–2014, and zero otherwise.
This latter variable, therefore, captures the additional effect of changes in the
post-2011 time period arising from the expansion of port facilities at Port
Qasim. The results in regression 1 demonstrate quite clearly that these invest-
ments in port capacity strongly attenuated the negative impacts of IC3 felt in
the first part of the period. In the years from 2007 to 2011, exports fell by 11%
compared with the counterfactual but fell by only 2.3% compared with the
counterfactual in the 2012–2014 period.
In the remainder of table 5, we extend further the issue of consider the
robustness of the results to the possibility that the effects of IC3 are con-
founded by the escalation into war in Afghanistan and the increase in troop
numbers under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US com-
mand in 2006. The coincident timing of IC3 with the escalation into war in
neighbouring Afghanistan, in which the US was heavily involved compared
with many European countries, may suggest an upward bias in the (absolute)
estimated magnitude of the current estimates of IC3.
We use the historical narrative on the evolution of war in neighbouring
Afghanistan and the involvement of different countries within ISAF to
TABLE 5
Heterogeneity of the IC3 effect over time





























Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.561 0.561 0.551 0.553
Observations 589,486 589,486 558,099 307,015
NOTES: Dependent variable is log of exports per firm, by destination, by product and
year. Robust standard errors clustered at market–year level are in parentheses. These
coefficients were obtained using Stata/SE 13. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE =
fixed effect.
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consider a number of complementary approaches to this question. In regres-
sion 2 in table 5, we consider the fact that there were sharp increases in vio-
lence in Afghanistan after 2007 and a surge in troop numbers in 2009, with
further increases in the years up to 2011, ending with the death of Osama bin
Laden in Pakistan on May 1, 2011. If the war in Afghanistan has an important
bearing on the results found in previous tables, we would anticipate that this
would demonstrate itself by instability in the IC3 variable across time. While
IC3 and Afghan war events in 2007 and 2011 coincide, the upsurge in violence
and the expansion of troop numbers in 2009 does not. If the Afghan war con-
founds in some way with IC3 or the adoption of other security measures
against Pakistan, we would expect the effect on trade to be significantly differ-
ent in these years. In regression 2, we separate these into the period from the
beginning of the war to the surge in troop numbers in 2009 and the period up
to the death of Osama bin Laden, in 2011. We again express these using shift
dummies such that for example, the 2010–2011 period is measured relative to
the 2007–2009 period. We find no evidence of such a difference, which we
interpret as supporting the view that the Afghan war does not contaminate
our analysis of IC3.
An alternative explanation of our findings might occur because Afghanistan is
a landlocked country and the regional war may have led some exporters to use
Pakistan as a route to ports, possibly using Pakistan’s truck or retailers. We
investigate this point by exploiting the difference in the type of products
exported by both countries, with a large part of Pakistan’s exports being tex-
tiles and other manufactured goods and Afghanistan’s being agricultural
products. To capture this difference, we focus on exports of manufactured
goods only. Because the incentive to use Pakistan to carry its trade is again
likely to have been altered over the period of the war, we combine this with
the same time periods as we do in regression 2. The results from this regression
(reported as regression 3) again provide no support for the view that this
explains our previous findings, with very little change in the magnitude of the
estimated effects of IC3 compared with regression 2.
Finally, we draw on the fact that participation in ISAF was uneven
across European countries. In regression 4 in table 5, we include within the
counterfactual the European countries (Denmark, France, Netherlands,
Norway and the UK) that, like the US, participated in the Afghan war
throughout the period and therefore would be subject to the same “war
effect.” If participation in the Afghan war by the US spills over into its
trade with Pakistan in some way, then we would expect a similar effect for
these European countries, and thus such effects are removed when we use
these as the counterfactual for Pakistan–US trade. Again, we find no sup-
port for the view that our previous findings capture any effect of the
Afghan war. The magnitude of the estimated effect of IC3 between 2007
and 2009 in regression 5 is 9% compared with 11% in regression 2 and 10%
in regression 4, when we use only manufactured goods. The results also
display the same pattern across time.
24 S. Ali, R. Kneller and C. Milner
4. Extended analysis: Heterogeneity across firms
The results in tables 3 and 4 assume that the effects of the IC3 were hom-
ogenous across firms. Compared with the (pre-IC3) system of randomly inter-
cepting freight and diverting it to a foreign port, expected beyond-the-border
time costs fell following the introduction of IC3 for freight continuing to be
sent via Port Qasim or being switched to Port Qasim, freight now being sent
with certainty directly to the US once it cleared Pakistan customs.24 The docu-
mentation on the creation of a pre-shipment scanning facility prior to its intro-
duction describes the program as therefore consistent with the idea of trade
facilitation.25 At-the-border and behind-the-border costs rose, however, for
some exporters. Exporters continuing to export after IC3 from Port Qasim
(“incumbents”) or switching to export from Port Qasim post-IC3 (“switchers”)
faced increased costs because of the time spent scanning at the port and because
of congestion at the port gates due to the concentration of scanning equipment
at this single location.26 We summarize this information in table 6, where we
summarize the change in trade costs according to the pre- and post-IC3 use of
Port Qasim or a different post (labelled other)
As the table summarizes, for those exporters that continued to use ports
other than Port Qasim (“stayers”), beyond-the-border trade costs rose com-
pared with the pre-IC3 scheme because of their required diversion to a foreign
port for scanning. This is demonstrated by the increased maritime distances
and sailing times given in table 1, but also arose because of the time spent at
the foreign port for scanning. For freight routed this way, at-the-border and
24 The implementation of IC3 required that all full-container-load cargo be
switched to Port Qasim for scanning. Less-than-full loads could continue to use
ports other than Qasim.
25 Documents of the national customs authorities, as well as of the Pakistan
Trade Policy Review (World Trade Organization 2007), describe it as a step
towards facilitating trade by curtailing vessel sailing time to the US,
eliminating transhipment requirements at intermediary ports for scanning and
simplifying procedural formalities at the port of origin and destinations, in
addition to ensuring the security of the supply chain.
26 Port Qasim is relatively poorly connected with the hinterland compared with
the Port of Karachi, which is the main sea port of Pakistan. Port of Karachi
also has better port infrastructure and handling facilities. Moreover, the major
support services, such as shipping agents and freight forwarders, are located
near the Port of Karachi. The IC3 scanning yard at Port Qasim is located
outside the main port terminal. This means there is a need for unloading,
handling and internal transportation, which further increases the costs, in
addition to causing delays. Because Port Qasim is connected to the main road
network through Karachi, cargo vehicles have to wait in the daytime to ply
through the mega city of 22 million people. To avoid traffic congestion, heavy
traffic is allowed to pass through the city only after 11 p.m.
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behind-the-border trade costs were unaltered. In comparison, for freight that
had previously been routed through an alternative home port but was now
switched to using Port Qasim, behind-the-border trade costs rose as exporters
faced the further internal distance and therefore additional cost of transferring
their cargo to Port Qasim rather than to Karachi or to their other previous
choice of shipment (see table 2).
A natural question that follows from these differential changes in behind-
the-border and beyond-the-border trade costs for different types of exporting
firms is how much trade continued to use other ports in Pakistan and how
much switched to using Port Qasim? The percentage of the total value of
exports to the US using of Port Qasim versus the alternative ports, including
Port of Karachi, dry ports and airfreight for 2005 to 2014 is shown in figure 1.
Following the introduction of IC3, the percentage of export value using the
Port of Karachi fell, although this appears to be driven by a rise in the use of
dry ports and airfreight as well as Port Qasim. This is consistent with evidence
from a European Commission report into the US scanning of freight globally,
including the project in Pakistan, which noted limited immediate switching of
freight to Port Qasim. Freight transferred through dry ports required security
clearance from the US, but this could be done at Port Qasim or elsewhere.
The share of trade using Port Qasim rose more quickly in the years 2009 and
2010, such that by 2011 it accounted for over 65% of total exported cargo to
the US.
In an extension to the empirical analysis, we study the trade effects
separately for those firms that had used Port Qasim and non-Port Qasim
ports prior to introduction of IC3. For this, we create three sets of firms
according to their use of exporting locations in the 2006 data: those that
previously used Port Qasim exclusively and continued to export from Port
TABLE 6
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Qasim post-IC3 (“incumbents”); those that had previously used the Port
of Karachi, dry ports and air freight and changed to Port Qasim (“switch-
ers”); and those that continued to export from other than Port Qasim
(“stayers”). Note that this separation of firms allows us also to implicitly
explore the effects of an alternative counterfactual. “Incumbents” and
“switchers” are firms that are affected by both the 100% scanning require-
ment and the use of pre-shipment clearance, while “stayers” are firms that
are affected by the 100% scanning requirement only. Our estimate of the
IC3 effect in the base analysis is a weighted average of the scanning
requirement alone and joint scanning and pre-shipment clearance effects.
The estimated trade effect for the “stayers” (in absolute terms and relative
to that for the non-stayers) allows us to comment on the alternative coun-
terfactual: What if 100% scanning had been applied without the creation
of the pre-shipment clearance facility at Port Qasim?
In table 7, we group firms according to this classification of exporting firms
and to distinguish between the average post-IC3 effect and the effect of IC3
after the expansion of Port Qasim facilities in 2011. In these regressions, the
variable IC3 (First treatment) is a dummy variable equal to one for the
2007–2014 period, and zero otherwise, and IC3 (Second treatment) is also a
dummy variable equal to one for the 2011–2014 period, and zero otherwise.
This latter variable, therefore, captures the additional effect of changes in the
post-2011 time period arising from the expansion of port facilities at Port
Qasim.
Regressions 1 to 3 in table 7 report regressions for the modified treatment
effect for each of the groupings of exporting firms. We anticipate that an
increase in total (behind-the-border and beyond-the-border) trade costs was
least likely for “incumbents” because any increase in costs arising from IC3-
induced congestion at Port Qasim would tend to be offset by expected lower
beyond-the-border trade costs due to the avoidance of diversion for scanning
on route to the US. By contrast, “stayers” must experience higher trade costs;
although behind-the-border costs are on average unaltered, beyond-the-
border costs must have risen because all shipments were diverted to an inter-
national port for scanning post-IC3. Like for “incumbents” (and for the same
reason), beyond-the-border trade costs fell for “switchers” as a result of IC3;
but this may have been more than offset by the effects of switching on behind-
the-border trade costs, increases in internal transport distances to the port of
exporting and increased delays due to port congestion pushing up this element
of trade costs.
The results in table 7 are in line with the expected heterogeneity of the IC3
effect across exporter types and over time. We find no significant IC3 effect on
the exports of “incumbents” (regression 1) but a significant negative effect of
IC3 on both “switchers” (regression 2) and “stayers” (regression 3). The
negative IC3 effect on exports is in fact greater for “stayers” than “switchers.”
Indeed, the negative effect on “switchers” is shown to be reduced post the
expansion of port facilities and capacity at Port Qasim in 2011. Note also the
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highly credible finding that there is not a significant second treatment
effect in the case of “incumbents” and “stayers.” Firms continuing to
export from other than Port Qasim (“stayers”) would not be expected to
be affected by the expansion of Port Qasim’s facilities. “Incumbents” could
have been affected by the improvements in 2011 but were not, in fact,
found to be significantly affected by IC3 after 2007 (though the pattern of
signs on the first and second treatment effects is consistent with an
improvement story).27 Note, finally, the much larger negative trade effect
for “stayers” than for non-stayers (“incumbents” and “switchers”). It is
evident from this that 100% scanning without the pre-clearance facility
was likely to have had been much more trade-deterring than with this
facility. This finding is not inconsistent, however, with the finding that the
implementation of IC3 was not trade-facilitating overall for “incumbents,”
“switchers” or “stayers.” Indeed, we find that IC3 was trade-deterring for
“switchers” and “stayers.”
TABLE 7















Firm–destination, product and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.631 0.530 0.713
Observations 147,449 365,566 7,665
NOTES: Dependent variable is log of exports per firm, by destination, by product and
year. Robust standard errors clustered at market–year level are in parentheses. These
coefficients were obtained using Stata/SE 13. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
three sets of firms indicated in the column heads are constructed as per the use of
exporting locations in the 2006 data: incumbents are those that previously used Port
Qasim exclusively and continued to export from Port Qasim in the post-IC3 period;
switchers are those that had previously used the Port of Karachi, dry ports and air
freight and changed to Port Qasim; and stayers are those that continued to export from
other than Port Qasim.
27 As a final check on the robustness of our findings, we explored the IC3 effect
(for the whole post-2007 period and the expansion of Port Qasim facilities in
2011) using the number of shipments rather than export values as the
dependent variable. The DID estimates, using the same methodology as for the
main results, show a statistically significant (at the 1% level) drop in the
number of shipments to the US relative to the EU after the first intervention
and rise in the same after the second intervention, which is consistent with our
main results.
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5. Summary conclusions and policy implications
The US has aimed over the last decade to reduce the threat to national
security from containerized cargos shipped to its ports. In the case of the IC3
program introduced in 2007, the US sought not to reduce the security threat
by requiring the comprehensive scanning of imports from Pakistan but also to
reduce “beyond-the-border” trade costs for Pakistan exporters by providing
scanning technology in Pakistan (thereby avoiding the need for the diversion
of ships to international ports with scanning facilities). The program was rep-
resented ex ante as being both pro security and trade-facilitating. The present
study finds, however, that IC3 actually reduced Pakistan’s exports to the US
in the 2007–2014 period. This finding is robust to alternative estimation meth-
ods and alternative controls, including controls made possible by the use of
firm- and destination-level export data. In particular, the scale of the export
reduction effect of IC3 is upwardly biased if aggregate trade is used and does
not allow for the control of firm–destination-specific effects, with specific firms
in Pakistan selecting or having acquired the attributes required for the US
export.
The finding of net export reduction is consistent with raising total trade
costs for Pakistan exporters to the US, relative to their trade costs to other
destinations and in particular to the control destination of the EU. This might
be considered an unexpected outcome because the provision as part of IC3 of
a scanning facility in Pakistan avoided the diversion of ships to international
ports and reduced international shipping distances and shipping times
between Pakistan and US ports. The simultaneous reduction in “beyond-the-
border” trade costs and increase in total trade costs is possible only if IC3 also
led to an increase in “behind-the-border” trade costs. We find this we occurred
because of a specific feature of the design of the IC3 program, with scanning
facilities made available only in Pakistan at one port, namely Port Qasim.
We observe from our data the switching in the post-IC3 period of some
firms’ US-bound exports via Port Qasim. These exporters who switched to
Port Qasim had to incur increased internal transport costs associated with
greater distances travelled to this port. The increase in exporting from Port
Qasim also resulted in greater congestion in and around the port and to slower
clearance through the port for those continuing to export from Port Qasim
and for those switching to Port Qasim. Indeed, these by-product effects of the
increased use of Port Qasim by exporters to the US would have reduced the
incentive for some exporters to switch to this port. Again, from the data, we
observe firms that continued to export via other Port Qasim, including the
Port of Karachi and many of the exporters from the Karachi area. For these
firms, “behind-the-border” trade costs were not directly affected by IC3, but
the 100% scanning requirement meant that diversion via an international port
with scanning facilities was now certain rather than possible. Average or
expected beyond-the-border trade costs rose, in fact, for this group of “stay-
ers.” Further, we find that the trade-deterring effect for “stayers” was larger
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than it was for firms that switched to using the pre-shipment scanning facility,
indicating that pre-shipment clearance ameliorated the effects of 100% scan-
ning but did not eliminate them.
The present findings emphasize the need to recognize both behind-the-
border and beyond-the-border trade cost effects in the design of measures to
increase security. This may well be particularly important in the context of
developing countries, for whom the infrastructure and institutional capacity
to implement new security measures is constrained. They also demonstrate
the benefits of using disaggregate, firm-level data to model and measure the
trade effect of such security measures because these data allow the investiga-
tor to explore the heterogeneity of the trade effect across firms in different
locations who may or may not export from the same port before and after the
implementation of the program. In the present context, we show that firms
already exporting from Port Qasim pre-IC3 (“incumbents”) did not experi-
ence a significant impact on their exports due to IC3. By contrast, for those
exporters who switched to exporting from Port Qasim (“switchers”) and those
continuing to export from other than Port Qasim (“stayers”), IC3 had a sig-
nificant negative effect on exports, though the negative effect for “switchers”
was reduced post-2011 by the expansion of facilities at Port Qasim.
The present findings have policy implications for the ongoing drive to
deploy similar technologies aimed at ensuring the security of the global supply
chain. They show how adding another layer of security to already very thick
national borders can influence the behaviour of exporting firms and disrupt
existing trade flows. In the wake of the emerging security situation in different
parts of the world, the implementation of arrangements similar to IC3 at other
ports may also have the unintended effect of reducing rather than facilitating
trade. This implies that policymakers need to consider domestic, as well as
international, aspects of trade costs and have a comprehensive view of the
nature of trade costs. This is so for policy makers in all countries, but it is
likely to be particularly relevant in the context of developing countries.
Supporting information
Supplementary material accompanies the online version of this article.
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